Putin's Russia shouldn't win with missile cheats: Column

In its latest “in your face” assault on international law, Russia has developed and now deployed operationally an intermediate-range cruise missile — a weapon that the U.S. and USSR solemnly agreed to ban in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The U.S. has long known that the new Russian missile, the SSC-8, was being developed and has sought to bring Russia back into compliance.  After denying for years it had been developing such a weapon, within the past few months Russia cheated even more flagrantly by deploying an operational battalion. A second battalion remains at the development site and no doubt could be fielded quickly.

This blatant violation of the INF Treaty cannot go unanswered — and not just by diplomatic complaints. Once before, Russia (née Soviet Union) violated an arms control treaty in such a blatant way, by constructing and operating a radar at Krasnoyarsk which clearly violated the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Both Republican and Democratic administrations tolerated the violation, responding only through specified channels and diplomatic entreaties. This tolerance, perhaps, was one reason the Russians were willing to violate the INF Treaty in a way they had to know would be recognized instantly by U.S. surveillance systems.

Toleration of cheating can only encourage cheaters to continue their malevolent behavior. It also jeopardizes support for other treaty arrangements. The INF violation, if not countered, will reinforce those in the U.S., now including President Trump, who have expressed doubts about the benefits of the 2011 New START Treaty, which limits U.S. and Russian long-range missile launchers, bombers and the nuclear warheads which they carry. If the U.S. were to withdraw from New START, as some have urged, it would lead to a renewal of the dangerous and expensive U.S.-Russia competition to deploy additional long-range weapons, the nuclear arms race that characterized the Cold War, as well as deal a probably fatal blow to efforts to contain the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nations.

What Trump could learn from Nixon: Column

We're lucky Trump is clueless about foreign policy: Robert Robb

Some have suggested that the appropriate U.S. response to Russia’s cheating on INF would be to deploy a similar weapon of our own in Europe. It would be easy technically, as the U.S. is very good at building cruise missiles. But it would ignite a political firestorm in Europe, reopening the bitter divisions within the NATO alliance and within individual nations that were doused 30 years ago, in fact, by completion of the INF Treaty. It also would be useless militarily. The new Russian missile adds little to the nuclear threats that Russia already poses to Europe. NATO’s existing nuclear forces and far-superior conventional military capabilities are more than sufficient to deter Russian aggression against the alliance.

POLICING THE USA: A look at race, justice, media

Putin's mission is already accomplished: Jill Lawrence

A far better response would be asymmetrical, building on the U.S. and NATO’s advanced technical capabilities. In private conversations, U.S. and NATO officials should make clear to Russian leaders that unless they cease developing and fielding SSC-8 cruise missiles, and destroy the ones that already exist in a verifiable manner, the U.S. will deploy, in Europe, substantial numbers of the stealthy Long-range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile. Now being developed by the Air Force for use initially on older long-range bombers, the LRSO is designed to be able to penetrate any air defense system that Russia could possibly develop for years to come. The weapon will be relatively inexpensive and, once developed, could be built quickly in large numbers. The LRSO will have the capability to be equipped with nuclear warheads, but if Russia did not come into compliance with the INF Treaty and the had to carry through with its threat to deploy LRSOs in Europe, they could be armed with conventional warheads. The accuracy planned for the LRSO would enable even conventionally-armed versions to destroy a vast array of targets.

Russian leaders know that their new cruise missile has no military value. One can only guess at their motives for developing the weapon, but they likely are political — to weaken NATO by reigniting the debates that nearly destroyed the alliance in the 1980s. Responding to the Russian violation with conventionally-armed LRSOs would counter Russia’s cheating effectively, while avoiding the political fall-out that would accompany a nuclear response.

Barry M. Blechman is co-founder of the Stimson Center.

You can read diverse opinions from our Board of Contributors and other writers on the Opinion front page, on Twitter @USATOpinion and in our daily Opinion newsletter. To submit a letter, comment or column, check our submission guidelines.